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Abstract
No-signaling proofs, motivated by quantum computation, have found applications in cryp-
tography and hardness of approximation. An important open problem is characterizing the
power of no-signaling proofs. It is known that 2-prover no-signaling proofs are characterized by
PSPACE, and that no-signaling proofs with poly(n)-provers are characterized by EXP. How-
ever, the power of k-prover no-signaling proofs, for 2 < k < poly(n) remained an open problem.
We show that k-prover no-signaling proofs (with negligible soundness) for k = O(
√
logn)
are contained in PSPACE. We prove this via two different routes that are of independent
interest. In both routes we consider a relaxation of no-signaling called sub-no-signaling. Our
main technical contribution (which is used in both our proofs) is a reduction showing how to
convert any sub-no-signaling strategy with value at least 1 − 2−Ω(k2) into a no-signaling one
with value at least 2−O(k
2).
In the first route, we show that the classical prover reduction method for converting k-
prover games into 2-prover games carries over to the no-signaling setting with the following loss
in soundness: if a k-player game has value less than 2−ck
2
(for some constant c > 0), then the
corresponding 2-prover game has value at most 1−2dk2 (for some constant d > 0). In the second
route we show that the value of a sub-no-signaling game can be approximated in space that is
polynomial in the communication complexity and exponential in the number of provers.
1 Introduction
Proofs lie at the heart of the theory of computation. The concept of proofs began to evolve in
the mid-eighties, starting with the seminal work on interactive proofs by Goldwasser, Micali and
Rackoff [10], which introduced the idea of using randomness and interaction in proofs. Interactive
proofs (IP) were introduced for the purpose of constructing zero-knowledge proofs, though were
realized to be quite powerful, in Shamir’s celebrated IP = PSPACE Theorem [23, 28].
Shortly after interactive proofs were introduced, multi-party interactive proofs were introduced
by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson [3]. In a multi-prover interactive proof (MIP)
a verifier is interacting with several non-communicating provers. This class was proven to be
extremely powerful, by Babai, Fortnow and Lund, who showed that MIP = NEXP [1]. The power
of this class stems from the assumption that the provers behave locally, namely, they see only the
messages sent to them, and do not have any information about messages sent to the other provers.
∗dholden@mit.edu
†yael@microsoft.com
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In reality, however, it is not clear how to ensure that the provers behave locally. Even if the
provers are placed in different rooms, with no communication channels between them, they may
share quantum entanglement, which can cause their strategies to be correlated, and non-local.
These attacks can be powerful, even though at first they may seem to be benign [7].
These quantum strategies motivated the notion of no-signaling strategies, which is the subject
of this work. The notion of no-signaling strategies was first studied in physics in the context of
Bell inequalities by Khalfin and Tsirelson [20] and Rastall [26], and it has gained much attention
after it was reintroduced by Popescu and Rohrlich [25]. No-signaling attacks are more general than
quantum attacks. In a no-signaling attack the cheating provers can collude, and thus each answer
can be a function of all the queries. The only restriction is that for any subset of provers the
answers provided by these provers should not convey any information about the queries given to
the other provers. Namely, the only restriction that is placed on the (possibly colluding) cheating
provers, is that their answers cannot be seen as “evidence” that information has travelled between
them.
If we think of the provers as being placed very far away from each other (say in different planets),
then the no-signaling restriction allows the provers to behave arbitrarily, as long as they adhere to
the physical principle that information cannot travel faster than light, a consequence of Einstein’s
special relativity theory. In particular, all the strategies that can be realized by provers that share
entangled quantum states are no-signaling strategies. Moreover, the principle that information
cannot travel faster than light is a central principle in physics, and is likely to remain valid in any
future ultimate theory of nature, since its violation means that information could be sent from
future to past. Therefore, soundness against no-signaling strategies is likely to ensure soundness
against provers that obey a future ultimate theory of physics, and not only the current physical
theories that we have, that are known to be incomplete.
Importantly, although no-signaling strategies are motivated by quantum entanglement, they
found compelling applications outside the realm of quantum physics. In particular, they have been
proved to be instrumental for constructing succinct delegation schemes (under standard crypto-
graphic assumptions), and in the realm of hardness of approximation.
The applicability of no-signaling to computation delegation. Kalai, Raz, and Roth-
blum [18] demonstrated the significance of no-signaling by showing that any MIP that is secure
against no-signaling attacks1 can be converted into a single-prover one-round proof system (with
computational soundness). More specifically, they show that the PIR (or FHE) heuristic, proposed
by Biehl, Meyer, and Wetzel et. al. [4], for converting any MIP to a single prover one-round proof
system is sound if the underlying MIP has no-signaling soundness.
In [19], the same authors constructed an MIP that is secure against no-signaling attacks for
every language in EXP, thus yielding the first one-round delegation scheme for all determinis-
tic computations, under standard cryptographic assumptions. This application of no-signaling to
computation delegation has proved to be very fruitful, and yielded numerous followup works (e.g.,
[16, 5, 2])
The applicability of no-signaling to hardness of approximation. Kalai, Raz and Regev [17]
showed the significance of no-signaling to hardness of approximation. In particular, they showed
that it is hard to approximate the value of a linear program in space 2logn
o(1)
, even if the polytope
is fixed (i.e., even if the algorithm has unbounded time to preprocess the polytope), and even if
1To be precise, [18] considered a slightly more relaxed notion, which they called statistical no-signaling. We neglect
this difference here.
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all the coefficients are non-negative (which is the regime where hardness of approximation is most
meaningful). More specifically, they showed that there exists a fixed polytope (corresponding to the
set of all possible non-signaling strategies) such that approximating the value of a linear program
(with positive coefficients) is P-complete with a polylog-space reduction. Prior work [8, 27, 9, 22],
demonstrated such hardness of approximation for the case where the polytope was not fixed (and
preprocessing is not allowed).
The importance of the notion of no-signaling, gives rise to the following fundamental question:
What is the power of multi-prover proofs that are sound against no-signaling strategies?
This is precisely the question we study in this work. In what follows, we denote the class of
one-round multi-prover interactive proofs with no-signaling soundness by NS MIP. We denote by
k-prover NS MIP the class of one-round k-prover interactive proofs with no-signaling soundness.
1.1 Prior Work
Ito, Kobayashi and Matsumoto [15] proved that 2-prover NS MIP contains PSPACE (by proving
that the 2-prover scheme of Cai, Condon, and Lipton [6] is in fact secure against no-signaling
strategies). Shortly after, Ito [13] proved that 2-prover NS MIP is contained in PSPACE, thus
characterizing the power of 2-prover NS MIP. The power of k-prover NS MIP, for k ≥ 2, remained
open.
It is known that NS MIP is contained in EXP since one can find the best no-signaling strategy
by solving an exponential-size linear program. Therefore, the power of a k-prover NS MIP lies
between PSPACE and EXP. More recently, Kalai, Raz and Rothblum [19] showed that there exists
a constant c ∈ N such that for every k ≥ nc, k-prover NS MIP contains EXP, thus characterizing
the power of k-prover NS MIP for k ≥ nc.
These works left open the following question: What is the power of k-prover NS MIP for
2 < k < nc?
1.2 Our Results
Throughout this manuscript, we assume that an MIP has completeness at least 1 − negl(n), and
has soundness negl(n), for some negligible function negl(n).2 This assumption is standard in
cryptography. We mention that often in the definition of interactive proofs (or possibly in the
definition of MIPs), completeness is required to be greater than 2/3 and soundness at most 1/3;
this is because it is well known that this gap can be amplified to 1−negl(n) and negl(n) via parallel
repetition (where the verifier accepts if 2/3 − ǫ of the repetitions are accepted, for some small
constant ǫ > 0). In the no-signaling regime we do not have a parallel repetition theorem [12], and
hence cannot amplify soundness via parallel repetition.
We prove that k-prover NS MIP with k = O(
√
log n) is contained in PSPACE. More generally,
we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). There exist constants c, d > 0 such that any k-prover MIP with no-
signaling soundness at most 2−ck
2
and completeness at least 1−2−dk2 , is contained in SPACE
(
poly(n, 2k
2
)
)
.
We emphasize that this theorem holds only for MIPs that have negligible soundness and al-
most perfect completeness. In particular, we don’t rule out the existence of a k-prover MIP with
NS soundness 1/3 and completeness 2/3 for EXP, with k = log n. However, the soundness and
completeness gap of such MIPs could not be amplified (to 1− negl(n)) without adding provers.
2A function µ : N→ N is said to be negligible if approaches zero faster than the inverse of any polynomial.
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We present two alternative routes for proving Theorem 1.1, each is of independent interest.
Both routes consider the more relaxed notion of sub-no-signaling, as defined in [21] (for the goal
of obtaining a parallel repetition theorem for no-signaling strategies). Both rely on the following
theorem that asserts that one can convert any sub-no-signaling strategy into a no-signaling one,
albeit with a substantial loss in the success probability.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). There exist constants c, d > 0 such that for any k-prover MIP, if there
exists a sub-no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability at least 1− 2−dk2 , then there exists
a no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability at least 2−ck
2
.
The proof of this theorem contains the bulk of technical difficulty of this work, and is used as a
building block in both proofs of Theorem 1.1. See Section 2.3 for the proof idea, and see Section 5
for the precise theorem statement and proof.
We note that a related theorem was proven by Lancien and Winter [21], who showed that, for
every game, if there exists a sub-no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability at least 1− ǫ
then there exists a no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability at least 1 − Γǫ, where Γ
may be as large as exponential in the communication complexity. This bound does not seem to be
tight enough in order to obtain Theorem 1.1.
We next present our two alternative routes for proving Theorem 1.1 (using Theorem 1.2). The
first is via a prover reduction method, and the second is via approximating the sub-no-signaling
value efficiently.
Reducing the number of provers. We show that (a slight variant of) the classical prover
reduction method for converting a k-prover MIP into a 2-prover MIP, carries over to the no-
signaling setting, albeit a substantial loss in soundness (which depends on k).
More specifically, in the seminal work of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson [3], they
presented a general method for converting a k-prover MIP into a 2-prover MIP, where in the
resulting 2-prover MIP the verifier sends one prover the queries (q1, . . . , qk) corresponding to all
the k provers in the underlying k-prover scheme, and expects to get back k answers (a1, . . . , ak); he
sends the other prover a single query qi corresponding to a random index i ∈ [k], and gets back an
answer a′i. The verifier accepts if and only if a
′
i = ai and if the verifier in the k-prover MIP accepts
the answers (a1, . . . , ak).
In the no-signaling setting, we slightly modify this transformation, by having the verifier in
the 2-prover MIP send the second prover a subset of queries {qi}i∈S for a randomly chosen subset
S ⊂ [k] (as opposed to a single query qi corresponding to a single index i ∈ [k]), and accepts if and
only if the answers (a1, . . . , ak) of the first prover are accepted by the verifier in the k-prover MIP
and if the answers of the second prover, denote by (a′i)i∈S satisfy that a
′
i = ai for every i ∈ S.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). There exist constants c, d > 0 such that for every k-prover MIP Π =
(P1, . . . , Pk, V ) with no-signaling soundness at most 2
−ck2 , the 2-prover MIP, obtained by perform-
ing the prover reduction transformation (described above) on Π, has no-signaling soundness at most
1− 2−dk2.
We prove Theorem 1.3 by using Theorem 1.2. We refer the reader to Section 2.1 for the proof
idea, and Section 4.1 for the precise theorem statement and proof.
We next argue that Theorem 1.3 implies Theorem 1.1. Let c, d be the constants from Theo-
rem 1.3. We prove Theorem 1.1 with constants c′ = c and d′ = 2d. To this end, fix any k-prover
MIP for a language L with no signaling soundness 2−ck
2
and completeness 1 − 2−2dk2 . Use Theo-
rem 1.3 to convert this MIP into a 2-prover MIP with no-signaling soundness 1 − 2−dk2 . By [13],
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the no-signaling value of any 2-player game can be approximated up to an additive factor of ǫ in
space poly(n, 1/ǫ). Setting ǫ = 2−2dk
2
, there exists an algorithm A that runs in space poly(n, 2k2),
such that on input an element x ∈ {0, 1}n ∩ L it outputs a value v ≥ 1 − 2 · 2−2dk2 , and on input
an element x ∈ {0, 1}n \ L it outputs a value v ≤ 1 − 2−dk2 + 2−2dk2 . This algorithm can be
used to decide whether x ∈ L (assuming without loss of generality that d > 2
k2
), implying that
L ∈ SPACE(poly(n, 2k2)).
Approximating the sub-no-signaling value. We next present an alternative route for proving
Theorem 1.1, without going through the prover reduction method presented above. Instead we
prove the following theorem, which is of independent interest.
Theorem 1.4 (Informal). The sub-no-signaling value of any k-prover MIP can be approximated
up to an additive factor ǫ by a poly(n, 2k, 1/ǫ)-space algorithm.
In particular this theorem implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1.5 (Informal). k-prover subNS MIP is contained in SPACE
(
poly(n, 2k)
)
.
See Section 2.2 for the proof idea, and see Section 4.2 for the precise theorem statements and
proofs.
We mention that a related (yet weaker) theorem was proven in [11], where it was shown that
given an MIP, one can distinguish between the case that its value is 1 (i.e., there exists a local
strategy that is accepted with probability 1) and the case that its sub-no-signaling value is at most
1 − δ, in space poly(n, 2k, 1/δ). This does not seem to be strong enough for us to use in order to
obtain Theorem 1.1.
We next argue that Theorem 1.4 and Theorem 1.2 imply Theorem 1.1. To this end, let c, d > 0
be the constants from Theorem 1.2. We prove Theorem 1.1 with any constants c′, d′ such that c′ > c
and d′ = 2d. Fix any k-prover MIP with soundness at most 2−c
′k2 < 2−ck
2
and completeness at least
1− 22dk2 . By Theorem 1.2 for every x ∈ {0, 1}n \L the sub-no-signaling value the MIP on input x
must be less than 1 − 2−dk2 . By Theorem 1.4, applied with ǫ = 2−2dk2 , there exists an algorithm
A, that given any x ∈ {0, 1}n, runs in space poly(n, 2k2) and approximates the sub-no-signaling
value of this MIP on input x up to an additive factor 2−2dk
2
. Therefore for every x ∈ {0, 1}n \ L,
the algorithm A(x) outputs an element v ≤ 1 − 2−dk2 + 2−2dk2 , and for every x ∈ {0, 1}n ∩ L the
algorithm A(x) outputs an element v ≥ 1−2 ·2−2dk2 . This algorithm can be used to decide whether
x ∈ L (assuming without loss of generality that d > 2
k2
), implying that L ∈ SPACE(poly(n, 2k2)).
2 Our Techniques
In this section, we first outline the high level overview of the proofs of Theorem 1.3 and Theorem 1.4
(the former uses Theorem 1.2 as a building block). We then present the high level overview of the
proof of Theorem 1.2, which contains the bulk of technical difficulty of this work.
2.1 Overview of Theorem 1.3
The main ingredient in the proof of Theorem 1.3, is a claim showing that any no-signaling strategy
for the 2-prover MIP that succeeds in convincing the verifier to accept with probability 1 − ǫ can
be converted into a sub-no-signaling strategy for the k-pover MIP that succeeds with probability
1− 2kǫ. This claim, together with Theorem 1.2, imply Theorem 1.3 in a relatively straightforward
manner.
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We next provide the high-level overview of the proof of this claim. Given a no-signaling strategy
for the 2-prover MIP we construct a sub-no-signaling strategy for the k-party MIP as follows: Given
q = (q1, . . . , qk), run the no-signaling strategy for the 2-prover MIP 2
k times. Namely, for every
subset S ⊆ [k], run the no-signaling prover for the 2-prover MIP, while giving the first prover all
the queries q = (q1, . . . , qk) and giving the second prover the subset (qi)i∈S . If the verifier accepts
the resulting answers in all the 2k executions then output the answers given by the first prover in
a random execution among these 2k executions. Otherwise, if even one of these proofs is rejected
then output ⊥.
One can easily argue that this strategy is accepted with probability 1 − 2kǫ (by a straightfor-
ward application of the union bound). Moreover, we argue that this strategy is sub-no-signaling.
Intuitively, this follows from the fact that if all of the 2k executions (of the 2-prover MIP) were
accepting, then for every subset S, the distribution of the answers (ai)i∈S is the same as the distri-
bution provided by the second prover in the 2-prover MIP on input (qi)i∈S , which is no-signaling.
We refer the reader to Section 4.1 for the formal proof.
2.2 Overview of the proof of Theorem 1.4
The proof of this theorem follows the approach of [13], who proved that the no-signaling value
of any 2-prover MIP can be approximated in PSPACE. Specifically, we define a linear program
corresponding to the k-prover MIP such that the value of the linear program is equal to the sub-no-
signaling value of the MIP. We then show that this linear program is of a specific form that allows
it to be approximated in PSPACE. Specifically, we show that this linear program can be converted
into a mixed packing and covering problem, and use the result of Young [29] which shows that such
problems can be approximated via a space-efficient algorithm. We refer the reader to Section 4.2
for the precise theorems and proofs.
2.3 Overview of the proof of Theorem 1.2
To prove Theorem 1.2, we need to show how to convert any sub-no-signaling strategy for a k-
prover MIP that succeeds with probability 1−2−dk2 into a no-signaling strategy that succeeds with
probability 2−ck
2
(for some constants c, d > 0). As mentioned above, this proof is quite involved
and contains the bulk of technical difficulty of this work.
Fix any k-prover MIP (P1, . . . , Pk, V ). Let us start by introducing some notations and defi-
nitions. In what follows, we let q = (q1, . . . , qk) denote a vector of queries that V may send to
the k provers, and denote by Q the set of all such possible k-tuples of queries. Similarly, we let
a = (a1, . . . , ak) denote a vector of responses sent by the k provers, and denote by A the set of
all possible such k-tuples of responses. For every subset S ⊆ [k], and every q ∈ Q and a ∈ A, we
denote by qS = (qi)i∈S and aS = (ai)i∈S . We define QS and AS analogously.
Recall that a no-signaling strategy allows the (cheating) provers to collude, and thus each
answer can be a function of all the queries. The only restriction is that for any subset S ⊆ [k]
of provers, the answers provided by the provers {Pi}i∈S should not convey any information about
the queries given to the provers {Pi}i∈[k]\S . Formally, a no-signaling strategy is defined by a set
of distributions {pq}q∈Q, where pq is the distribution of answers of the no-signaling provers upon
receiving the query q = (q1, . . . , qk), such that for every set S ⊆ [k] and every q, q′ ∈ Q such that
qS = q
′
S it holds that for every aS ∈ AS
Pr[pq|S = aS ] = Pr[pq′ |S = aS ],
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where
Pr[pq|S = aS ] ,
∑
a∗:a∗
S
=aS
Pr[pq = a
∗].
An equivalent definition is that there exists a set of distributions {pq}q∈Q and in addition a set of
distributions {SimS,qS}S⊆[k],qS∈QS such that for every S ⊆ [k], every q ∈ Q and every aS ∈ AS , it
holds that
Pr[pq|S = aS] = Pr[SimS,qS = aS ].
A sub-no-signaling strategy is defined by a set of sub-distributions3 {pq}q∈Q along with a set of
distributions {SimS,qS}S⊆[k],qS∈AS such that for every S ⊆ [k], every q ∈ Q and every aS ∈ AS , it
holds that
Pr[pq = aS ] ≤ Pr[SimS,qS = aS ], (1)
where as above, Pr[pq = aS ] ,
∑
a∗:a∗
S
=aS
Pr[pq = a
∗].
Note that sub-no-signaling strategies are less constrained than no-signaling ones. We next show
how to convert a sub-no-signaling strategy that succeeds in convincing V to accept (x /∈ L) with
probability 1− 2−dk2 into a no-signaling strategy that succeeds in convincing V to accept (x /∈ L)
with probability 2−ck
2
(for some constants c, d > 0).4
Fix any such sub-no-signaling strategy {pq}q∈Q together with a corresponding set of distribu-
tions {SimS,qS}S⊆[k],qS∈AS .
1. Step 1. We first reduce the probability of the “outliers” of pq. Namely, if there exists a
vector q ∈ Q, a subset S ⊂ [k], and answers aS such that Pr[pq|S = a|S ] is higher than the
average probability over all q∗’s such that q∗S = qS, then we lower Pr[pq|S = a|S ] towards the
average. Namely, we construct a family of distributions {p˜q}q∈Q such that for every q ∈ Q,
every S ⊆ [k], and every aS ∈ AS,
Pr[p˜q|S = aS ] ≤ Eq∗←V :q∗|S=qS Pr[pq|S = aS ].5
We note that ideally we would have liked to construct {p˜q}q∈Q that satisfies the above equation
where the inequality is replaced with equality, since then {p˜q}q∈Q would be no-signaling, and
we would be done. However, this is possible only if {pq} was no-signaling to begin with.
Therefore, we start with the more humble goal of omitting the “outliers”. Jumping ahead,
this will allow us (in Step 3a below) to construct a family of sub-distributions {Sim(1)S,qS} such
that such that for every S, T ⊆ [k] for which S ⊆ T , and for every q ∈ Q and aS ∈ AS,
Pr[Sim
(1)
T,qT
|S = aS] ≤ Pr[Sim(1)S,qS = aS ].
Then we will show how to convert this inequality to equality, and finally to a distribution (as
opposed to a sub-distribution), which will result with a family of no-signaling distributions.
We construct {p˜q} in a greedy manner, by starting with {pq} and then lowering the probabil-
ities (in a greedy manner) so that the inequality above is satisfied. Note that in the process
we lower the total probability of p˜q (it outputs ⊥ in the remaining probability). However, we
3A sub-distribution is similar to a probability distribution except that the sum of all the probabilities is required
to be at most 1 (as opposed to exactly 1).
4In what follows, we think of x as fixed, and omit it from the discussion.
5The notation q∗ ← V denotes the fact that q∗ is sampled according to the distribution of V .
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argue that the fact that {pq} is sub-no-signaling implies that the total probability is not re-
duced by too much. More specifically, we show that for every q ∈ Q, if Pra←pq [V (q, a)] = 1−δ
(for some δ > 0), then
Pr
a←p˜q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 1− 2kδ. (2)
We thus focus only on queries q ∈ Q for which pq convinces V to accept with probability
close to 1, as follows.
2. Step 2. Fix ǫ = 2−dk
2
such that
Pr
q←V,a←pq
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 1− ǫ
In what follows, we focus only on queries q ∈ Q such that
Pr
a←pq
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 1− 2ǫ,
and we denote the set of all such queries by GOOD. By a standard averaging argument we
show that
Pr[q ∈ GOOD] ≥ 1
2
.
From now on we focus only on q ∈ GOOD. Namely, we consider the modified game where the
queries are restricted to being in GOOD. Formally, we modify the MIP and consider a verifier
V ∗ that samples q as V , subject to the restriction that q ∈ GOOD, and V ∗ accepts if and
only if V accepts. From now on we focus on the MIP (P1, . . . , Pk, V
∗), and we construct a no-
signaling strategy only for q ∈ GOOD; i.e., only for queries in the support of the distribution
of queries generated by V ∗. Such a no-signaling strategy that is defined only for queries in the
support,is called honest referee no-signaling and was introduced in a recent work by Holmgren
and Yang [12] in the context of parallel repetition for no-signaling strategies. Moreover,
they showed that if there exists an honest-referee no-signaling strategy that succeeds with
probability δ then there exists a no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability 2−O(k
2)·δ.
Thus, it suffices to construct an honest-referee no-signaling strategy for (P1, . . . , Pk, V
∗).
3. Step 3. We construct the honest-referee no-signaling strategy via the following steps.
(a) Step 3(a) We first construct a family of sub-distributions {Sim(1)S,qS} such that for every
S, T ⊆ [k] for which S ⊆ T , and for every q ∈ Q and aS ∈ AS,
Pr[Sim
(1)
T,qT
|S = aS ] ≤ Pr[Sim(1)S,qS = aS ], (3)
and for every q ∈ GOOD
Pr
a←Sim
(1)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 1− 23k2 · ǫ. (4)
We later convert {Sim(1)S,qS} into a no-signaling distribution by converting Equation (3)
to an equality (as opposed to an inequality), and converting each Sim
(1)
S,qS
to be a distri-
bution (as opposed to a sub-distribution). This is achieved in Steps 3b and 3c below.
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In what follows we explain our construction of {Sim(1)S,qS}. Our initial idea is to define
Sim
(1)
S,qS
as follows: For every aS ∈ AS , define:
Pr[Sim
(1)
S,qS
= aS ] = max
q∗∈GOOD|(q∗
S
=qS)
Pr[p˜q∗ |S = aS ]
Note that this is a sub-distribution since
max
q∗∈GOOD|(q∗
S
=qS)
Pr[p˜q∗ |S = aS ] ≤ max
q∗∈GOOD|(q∗
S
=qS)
Pr[pq∗ |S = aS ] ≤ Pr[SimS,qS = aS ],
where the first inequality follows from the fact that by definition of {p˜q} ( Step 1), and
the second is by the definition of sub-no-signaling (Equation (1)).
At first, it may seem that {Sim(1)S,qS} satisfies Equation (3), since on the right-hand-side
of Equation (3) we maximize over a larger set of queries than we do on the left-hand-side.
However, this is not necessarily the case, since on the left-hand-side of Equation (3) we
sum over all aT that are consistent with aS , and for each one we take the best query q
that is consistent with qT , whereas on the right-hand-side we take a single best q (that
is consistent with qS) for aS.
To ensure that Equation (3) is satisfied, we update the definition of {Sim(1)S,qS} in a greedy
manner, by induction, as follows. For sets S of size 1 and for every qS ∈ QS , we keep the
definition of Sim
(1)
S,qS
as is. Suppose we defined Sim
(1)
S,qS
for all sets S of size less than i,
then for any set T of size i and any qT ∈ QT , update Sim(1)T,qT as follows: If there exists
S ( T and a set aS ∈ AS, such that
Pr[Sim
(1)
T,qT
|S = aS] > Pr[Sim(1)S,qS = aS ],
then reduce the probability of Sim
(1)
T,qT
so that
Pr[Sim
(1)
T,qT
|S = aS] = Pr[Sim(1)S,qS = aS ].
This process ensures that indeed Equation (3) is satisfied. However, it reduces the total
probability of Sim
(1)
[k],q, and we need to argue that it does not reduce the probability by
too much so that Equation (4) holds. Indeed, we prove that for every q ∈ GOOD,
Pr
a←Sim
(1)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 1− 23k2ǫ,
which is close to 1 if ǫ ≤ 2−4k2 .
(b) Step 3(b). We note that if {Sim(1)S,qS} was a family of distributions (as opposed to sub-
distributions) then this family would be no-signaling. Therefore, our goal is to convert
this family to a family of distributions while maintaining the sub-no-signaling property.
To this end, we first convert {Sim(1)S,qS} into a new family of sub-distributions {Sim
(2)
S,qS
}
that still satisfies Equation (3), but in addition satisfies that for every ℓ ∈ [k] there exists
a value αℓ ≥ 2−O(k2) such that for every S ⊂ [k] of size ℓ, and every qS ∈ QS ,
∑
aS∈AS
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS ] = αℓ, (5)
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and that for every q ∈ GOOD,
Pr
a←Sim
(2)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 2−O(k2).
This is done by simply normalizing each Sim
(1)
S,qS
accordingly. We note that this nor-
malization reduces the success probability. Nevertheless, Equation (5) is crucial, since it
will later allow us to convert the sub-distribution into a distribution while maintaining
the no-signaling guarantee.
(c) Step 3(c). We next define yet another family of sub-distributions {Sim(3)S,qS}. However,
to motivate this definition, let’s first try to define our honest-referee no-signaling strategy
{p∗q}q∈Q. We define it in a greedy manner, as follows. We start by defining
Pr[p∗q = a] = Pr[Sim
(2)
[k],q = a]
We would like to argue that Pr[p∗q|S = aS ] = Pr[Sim(2)S,qS = aS ]; however, all we can
guarantee is that Pr[p∗q|S = aS ] ≤ Pr[Sim(2)S,qS = aS ].
To remedy this, we extend the sub-distribution p∗q, as follows: For every i ∈ [k], let
A∗i = Ai ∪ {∗}, and let A∗ = A∗1 × . . . × A∗k. For each q ∈ Q, we extend the sub-
distribution p∗q as follows: We do not change its distribution over elements in A, but we
allow it to also output elements in A∗ that are not in A. More specifically, we extend p∗q
as follows: For any set S ⊆ [k] and any aS ∈ AS, we define
Pr[p∗q = (aS , ∗)] = Pr[Sim(2)S,qS = aS ]− Pr[p∗q |S = aS ]. (6)
Equation (3) ensures that this probability is non-negative. Moreover, Equation (6)
ensures that indeed
Pr[p∗q |S = aS ] = Pr[Sim(2)S,qS = aS ],
and hence only depends on qS as desired.
Unfortunately, this remedy does not work. The reason is that only initially it is true
that
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS ]− Pr[p∗q |S = aS ] ≥ 0.
However, as we extend the definition of p∗q, it’s probability mass grows, and can cause
the above term to become negative!
We note that even if we extend pq carefully, by induction (as we eventually do), by
starting with subsets of size [k− 1], and always defining Pr[p∗q = (aS , ∗)] with respect to
the updated version of {p∗q}, this process can result with Pr[Sim(2)S,qS = aS ]−Pr[p∗q |S = aS ]
being negative for some subset S ⊆ [k]. Intuitively, the reason is that when we add
elements of the form (aS , ∗) to the probability mass of pq, for a given subset S ⊆ [k],
this may increase Pr[pq|T = aT ] for subsets T ⊆ S, and may even increase them beyond
the value of Sim
(2)
T,qT
(aT ).
To remedy this, before we define {p∗q}q∈Q, we make one last adjustment to {Sim(2)S,qS} to
ensure that we can safely define p∗q as above, without reaching the negative regime.
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Specifically, for every subset S ⊆ [k] and every qS ∈ Q we define the sub-distribution
Pr[Sim
(3)
S,qS
= aS] ,
1
k2|S|
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS ]. (7)
We argue that if we define {p∗q}q∈Q as above, with respect to {Sim(3)S,qS} (as opposed to
{Sim(2)S,qS}) then we do not hit the negative regime.
In the formal proof (in Section 5), we prove that we can take {Sim(3)S,qS} to be any family
of sub-distributions that satisfies the condition that for every q ∈ Q and every S ⊆ [k],
Pr[Sim
(3)
S,qS
= aS ] ≥
k−|S|∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
∑
T)S,|T |=|S|+i
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S = aS ]
(this is the condition needed in order to avoid the negative regime when defining {p∗q}q∈Q
as above), and in addition satisfies the following three requirements (which {Sim(2)S,qS}
satisfied):
i. For every S, T ⊆ [k] for which S ⊆ T , and for every q ∈ Q and a ∈ A,
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S = aS] ≤ Pr[Sim(3)S,qS = aS ],
ii. For every ℓ ∈ [k] there exists a value αℓ ≥ 2−O(k2) such that for every S ⊂ [k] of size
ℓ, and every qS ∈ QS , ∑
aS∈AS
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS ] = αℓ,
iii. For every q ∈ GOOD,
Pr
a←Sim
(3)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 2−O(k2).
Defining {Sim(3)S,qS} as in Equation (7) is one (easy) way of ensuring that these four con-
ditions are satisfied. However, there may be an alternative way of defining {Sim(3)S,qS} in
a less lossy manner.
Finally, we note that by defining {p∗q}q∈Q as above, the total probability of p∗q may not
be exactly 1. It may be smaller than 1 or greater than 1. However, Item (3(c)ii) implies
that the total probability is fixed and does not depend on q. Therefore, we can safely
normalize it to be exactly 1 without damaging the honest-referee no-signaling guarantee.
We refer the reader to Section 5 for the formal proof.
Our Parameters. Recall that we convert a sub-no-signaling strategy with value at least 1−2−dk2
into a no-signaling strategy with value at least 2−ck
2
(for some constants c, d > 0). We don’t have
any reason to believe that this loss is inherent. In particular, we would have liked to convert any
sub-no-signaling strategy with value at least 1 − 2−dk into a no-signaling strategy with value at
least 2−ck. This would imply that O(log n)-prover no-signaling MIP is in PSPACE. This loss stems
mainly from two places: In Step 2, where we go from honest-referee no-signaling to no-signaling
(via a transformation from [12]), and in Step 3a, where we define Sim
(1)
S,qS
. There is another 2k log k
loss in Step 3c, however this loss is small compared to the other two. We do not know if any of
these losses are inherent, and leave it as an open problem to explore.
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3 Preliminaries
3.1 No-Signaling Games
Definition 3.1. A k-prover, one-round game is a tuple G = (Q1, ..., Qk, A1, ..., Ak, V, π), where
Q1, ..., Qk are sets of queries, A1, ..., Ak are sets of answers,
V : Q1 ×Q2 × ...×Qk ×A1 ×A2 × ...×Ak → {0, 1}
is a polynomial-time computable function, and π is a polynomial-time sampleable probability dis-
tribution over (Q1, ..., Qk).
Notation. We denote by Q , Q1 ×Q2 × ...Qk and A , A1 × A2 × ... × Ak. We also denote by
QS , Qs1 ×Qs2 × ...×Qs|S|, where S = {s1, s2, ..., s|S|}, and similarly for AS .
We denote by [k] = {1, . . . , k}. For every q = (q1, . . . , qk) ∈ Q, every a = (a1 . . . , ak) ∈ A, and
every S ⊆ [k], we denote by qS = (qi)i∈S and aS = (ai)i∈S .
Definition 3.2. A strategy for a game G = (Q,A, V, π) is a family of probability distributions
{pq}q∈Q over A ∪ {⊥}.
For any q ∈ Q, any a ∈ A, and any subset S ⊆ [k], we denote by
pq(aS) ,
∑
a∗∈A:a∗
S
=aS
pq(a
∗).
Definition 3.3. A strategy {pq}q∈Q for a k-player game G = (Q,A, V, π) is said to be no-signaling
if there exists a family of probability distributions {SimS,qS}S⊆[k],qS∈QS , where each SimS,qS is a
distribution over AS , such that for every q ∈ Q, every S ⊆ [k], and every aS ∈ AS,
pq(aS) = SimS,qS(aS).
Namely, a strategy is no-signaling if the marginal distributions of the answers are the same
regardless of the other queries. Note that if {pq}q∈Q is a no-signaling strategy then for every q ∈ Q,∑
aS
Pr[pq = aS ] =
∑
aS
Pr[SimS,qS = aS ] = 1,
which implies that Pr[pq = ⊥] = 0.
Two relaxations of the notion of no-signaling were considered in the literature: the first is the
notion of sub-no-signaling, by Lancien andWinter [21], and the second is the notion of honest-referee
no-signaling by Holmgren and Yang [12]. In both cases these relaxed notions were motivated by
the goal of proving a parallel repetition theorem for no-signaling strategies. We begin by defining
the latter notion.
Definition 3.4. A strategy {pq}q∈Q for a k-player game G = (Q,A, V, π) is said to be honest-
referee no-signaling if the no-signaling condition holds for every q ∈ Q such that Pr[π = q] > 0
(and is not required to hold for queries that are not in the support of π).
Formally, {pq}q∈Q is a honest-referee no-signaling strategy for G if there exists a family of
probability distributions {SimS,qS}S⊆[k],qS∈QS , where each SimS,qS is a distribution over AS, such
that for every q ∈ Q in the support of π, every S ⊆ [k], and every aS ∈ AS,
pq(aS) = SimS,qS(aS).
12
Definition 3.5. A strategy {pq}q∈Q for a k-player game G = (Q,A, V, π) is said to be sub-
no-signaling if there exists a family of probability distributions {SimS,qS}S⊆[k],qS∈QS , where each
SimS,qS is a distribution over AS, such that for every q ∈ Q, every S ⊆ [k], and every aS ∈ AS ,
pq(aS) ≤ SimS,qS(aS).
If {pq}q∈Q is a sub-no-signaling set of probability distributions, then for every q ∈ Q, if
∑
aS
pq(aS) <
∑
aS
SimS,qS(aS) = 1,
then in the remaining probability pq outputs ⊥.
Definition 3.6. Let NS(G) be the set of no-signaling strategies of a k-prover game G = (Q,A, V, π).
The no-signaling value of G is
VNS(G) = max
{pq}q∈Q∈NS(G)
∑
q∈Q
π(q)
∑
a∈A
pq(a)V (q, a).
Similarly, let hrNS(G) be the set of honest-referee no-signaling strategies of G. The honest-referee
no-signaling value of G is
VhrNS(G) = max
{pq}q∈Q∈hrNS(G)
∑
q∈Q
π(q)
∑
a∈A
pq(a)V (q, a).
Let subNS(G) be the set of sub-no-signaling strategies of G. The sub-no-signaling value of G is
VsubNS(G) = max
{pq}q∈Q∈subNS(G)
∑
q∈Q
π(q)
∑
a∈A
pq(a)V (q, a).
3.2 Linear Programming
Definition 3.7 ([24]). Fix any linear program given by max c⊤x subject to xS ≥ 0, xT unrestricted,
AUx ≤ bU , and AV x = bV , where S, T are disjoint and S ∪ T = [n], where n = |x|, and where
U, V are disjoint and U ∪ V = [m] where m is the number of rows of A, where A is defined to be
the matrix whose rows are the rows of AU and the rows of AV .
The dual of this linear program is defined by minb⊤y, where |y| = m, subject to yU ≥ 0, yV
unrestricted, A⊤S y ≥ cS , A⊤T y = cT .
Theorem 3.8 (Strong duality [24]). If the value of a linear program is finite then it is equal to the
value of its dual.
Definition 3.9 ([29]). A mixed packing and covering problem is a pair of non-negative matrices
A,C and a pair of non-negative vectors b, d. A solution to a mixed packing and covering problem
is a vector x such that x ≥ 0, Ax ≤ b, and Cx ≥ d.
Theorem 3.10 ([29]). Let (A, b,C, d) be a mixed packing and covering problem. Then, there exists
an algorithm running in space poly(log(|(A, b,C, d)|), 1/ǫ) to determine whether there does not exist
a solution to the mixed packing and covering problem or to output a solution to the mixed packing
and covering problem (A, b(1 + ǫ), C, d).
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4 No-Signaling Games with k Players and 2−Ω(k
2) Soundness are in
SPACE
(
poly(n, 2k
2
)
)
In what follows we state our main theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Fix any language L /∈ SPACE(poly(n, 2k)) and any k-prover one-round proof system
(P1, . . . , Pk, V ) for L with completeness c ≥ 1 − 2−5k2 . For every x consider the game Gx =
(Q,A, V, πx), where Q = Q1 × . . . × Qk and where Qi is the set of possible queries sent by V to
prover Pi, A = A1×, . . . ,Ak and where Ai is the set of possible answers sent by Pi, and πx is the
distribution of queries sent by V (x).
Then, there exists a constant a > 0 and an infinite set N ⊆ N, such that for every n ∈ N there
exists x ∈ {0, 1}n \ L such that VNS(Gx) ≥ 2−a·k2 .
We present two different proofs for Theorem 4.1. Both make use of the following theorem which
is the main technical contribution of this work.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a constant c ∈ N, such that for any k ∈ N and any k-player game G,
if VsubNS(G) ≥ 1− 2−4k2 then VNS(G) ≥ 2−c·k2.
We defer the proof of Theorem 4.2 to Section 5, and refer the reader to Section 2.3 for the
high-level overview of the proof. In what follows we present our proofs for Theorem 4.1, both using
Theorem 4.2 as a building block.
In the first proof, presented in Section 4.1, we rely on a prover reduction theorem which shows
that one can convert any k-player game with no-signaling value at most 2−O(k
2) into a 2-player game
with no-signaling value at most 1−2−Ω(k2). In the second proof, presented in Section 4.2, we rely on
the fact that one can approximate the sub-no-signaling of a k-player game up to an additive factor
ǫ, using an algorithm running in space poly(cc, 2k, 1/ǫ), where cc is the communication complexity
of the game.
4.1 From Multi-Prover No-Signaling Proofs to 2-Prover No-Signaling Proofs
In the classical setting there is a well known reduction that converts any k-player game into a
2-player. Below we present a slight variant of it, that will be useful in the no-signaling setting.
Let G = (Q,A, V, π) be a k-player game. Consider the following 2-player game, denoted by
T (G) = (Q∗,A∗, V ∗, π∗):
• Q∗ = (Q∗1,Q∗2), where Q∗1 = Q and Q∗2 = {S, qS}S⊆[k],qS∈QS .
• A∗ = (A∗1,A∗2), where A∗1 = A and A∗2 =
⋃
S⊆[k]AS.
• π∗ generates q ← π and generates a random subset S ⊆ [k]. It outputs (q, (S, qS)).
• V ∗((q, (S, qS)), (a, a′S)) accepts if and only if V (q, a) accepts and ai = a′i for every i ∈ S.
Theorem 4.3. Let G be a k-player game with no-signaling value less than 2−ck2 (where c ∈ N
is the constant from Theorem 4.2). Then the 2-player game T (G) has no-signaling value at most
1− 2−5k2.
Proof. Let G be a k-player game with no-signaling value less than 2−ck2 . Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that the no-signaling value of the 2-player game T (G) is 1 − ǫ, for ǫ < 2−5k2 . Let
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{pq,(S,qS)} be a no-signaling strategy that convinces the verifier V ∗ in the game T (G) to accept with
probability 1− ǫ.
Consider the sub-no-signaling strategy {pq} for the k-player game G, where Pq samples answers
as follows:
1. For every S ⊆ [k], sample (a, a′S)← pq,(S,qS).
2. If there exists S ⊆ [k] such that the above answers are rejecting (i.e., V ∗((q, (S, qS)), (a, a′S)) =
0) then output ⊥.
3. Otherwise, choose a random S ⊆ [k] and output a corresponding to this S.
Claim 4.4. {pq} is a sub-no-signaling strategy for the k-player game G.
Proof. By definition, the fact that {pq,(S,qS)} is a no-signaling distribution for the 2-player game
T (G), implies that there is a family of distributions {Simq} ∪ {SimS,qS} ∪ {Simq,(S,qS)} such that
for every q ∈ Q, for every S ⊆ [k] and every aS ∈ AS ,
Pr[pq,(S,qS)|(S,qS) = aS ] = Pr[SimS,qS = aS ].
We prove that {pq} is sub-no-signaling with respect to {SimS,qS}. Namely, we prove that for every
q ∈ Q, every S ⊆ [k], and every aS ∈ AS ,
Pr[pq|S = aS ] ≤ Pr[SimS,qS = aS ]. (8)
We note that Equation (8) would clearly hold if we chose a corresponding to the specific set S in
the equation. However, recall that pq chooses a corresponding to a random subset S
′ ⊆ [k].
Thus, we define for every (fixed) S ⊆ [k] a strategy {pSq } which is identical to {pq}, except
that if it doesn’t abort then it always outputs a corresponding to the fixed subset S. Therefore,
to conclude the proof that {pq} is sub-no-signaling it suffices to prove that for every q ∈ Q, every
a ∈ A, and every subsets S, S′ ⊆ [k], it holds that
Pr[pSq = a] = Pr[p
S′
q = a],
which follows directly from the the fact that {pq,(S,qS)} is no-signaling (together with the definition
of {pSq }).
Note that the sub-no-signaling strategy {pq} is rejected with probability at most 2k · ǫ (by the
union bound).
This in particular implies that the sub-no-signaling value of G is at least
1− 2k · ǫ ≥ 1− 2k · 2−5k2 ≥ 1− 2−4k2 ,
which by Theorem 4.2 implies that the no-signaling value of G is at least 2−ck2 , contradicting our
assumption.
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4.2 Approximating the Sub-No-Signaling Value of k-Player Game via a Space
Efficient Algorithm
Theorem 4.5. There exists an algorithm B and a polynomial p such that for any k-player game
G = (Q,A, V, π), and any ǫ > 0, it holds that B(G, ǫ) runs in space p(log(|Q,A|), 1/ǫ, 2k) and
outputs a value v such that |v − VsubNS(G)| ≤ ǫ.
Corollary 4.6. Fix any language L and any k-prover one-round proof system (P1, . . . , Pk, V ) for L.
For every x consider the game Gx = (Q,A, V, πx), where Q = Q1× . . .×Qk and where Qi is the set
of possible queries sent by V to prover Pi, A = A1×, . . . ,Ak where Ai is the set of possible answers
sent by Pi, and πx is the distribution of queries sent by V (x).
Denote by c the completeness of this proof system.6 If there exists a constant d ∈ N, such
that for every large enough n ∈ N, and every x ∈ {0, 1}n \ L, VsubNS(Gx) ≤ c − 1nd , then L ∈
SPACE
(
poly(n, 2k)
)
.7
Proof of Corollary 4.6. Fix any language L and any k-prover one-round proof system (P1, . . . , Pk, V )
for L with completeness c. For every x ∈ {0, 1}∗, consider the corresponding game Gx as defined
in the corollary statement. Suppose that there exists a constant d ∈ N, such that for every large
enough n ∈ N, and every x ∈ {0, 1}n \ L, VsubNS(Gx) ≤ c− 1nd .
Fix ǫ = 1
10·nd
. From Theorem 4.5 we know that there exists an algorithm B, that given any
k-prover game G = (Q,A, V, π), and any parameter ǫ, approximates the value of G up to an additive
ǫ error. Importantly B is an algorithm with space complexity poly(log(|(Q,A)|), 1/ǫ, 2k).
Given x ∈ {0, 1}∗, we determine if x ∈ L by running B(Gx, 1/ǫ), and if the value is at least c− ǫ
then we conclude that x ∈ L, and otherwise conclude that x /∈ L.
Note that 1/ǫ is a polynomial in n since ǫ = 1
10nd
. In addition, the size of Q,A is exponential
in n, which implies that the space complexity of B(Gx, 1/ǫ) is poly(n, 2k), as desired.8 Finally,
we note that there may be a finite number of n’s for which we do not have the guarantee that
VsubNS(Gx) ≤ c− 1nd . For these n’s, we can hard-wire the answers for whether x ∈ L.
We next prove Theorem 4.5. We use the approach of [14] which proves that the no-signaling
value of a two-player, one-round game can be approximated in PSPACE.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Fix any game G = (A,Q, V, π). The sub-no-signaling value of G is given
by the following linear program (where the variables are pq(a) and SimS,qS(aS), for every q ∈ Q,
a ∈ A, and nonempty S ⊆ [k])
Maximize
∑
q∈Q π(q)
∑
a∈A pq(a)V (q, a)
Subject to
∑
a∗∈A:a∗
S
=aS
pq(a
∗)) ≤ SimS,qS(aS) ∀S ⊆ [k],∀aS ∈ AS ,∀q ∈ Q,
∑
aS∈AS
SimS,qS(aS) = 1 ∀S ⊆ [k],∀qS ∈ QS
pq(a) ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,∀q ∈ Q
(9)
6A proof system is said to have completeness c if for every x ∈ L the honest provers convince the verifier to accept
x ∈ L with probability at least c. In particular, this implies that VsubNS(Gx) ≥ c for every x ∈ L.
7This is assuming the communication complexity is poly(n). In the general case, where the communication
complexity is cc, we get that L ∈ SPACE
(
poly(n, cc, 2k)
)
8More generally, if (P1, . . . , Pk, V ) has communication complexity cc then |(Q,A)| ≤ 2
cc, in which case the space
complexity of B(Gx, 1/ǫ) is poly(n, cc, 2
k), as desired.
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In what follows, we replace pq(a) with xq(a) = π(q)pq(a) to simplify the expression of the
objective value. This gives us the linear program
Maximize
∑
q∈Q
∑
a∈A xq(a)V (q, a)
Subject to
∑
a∗∈A:a∗
S
=aS
xq(a
∗) ≤ π(q)SimS,qS(aS) ∀S ⊆ [k],∀aS ∈ AS∀q,∈ Q
∑
aS
SimS,qS(aS) = 1 ∀S ⊆ [k],∀qS ∈ QS
xq(a) ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,∀q ∈ Q
(10)
Observe that the constraints in this linear program above imply that SimS,qS(aS) ≥ 0 for every
S ⊆ [k], every qS ∈ QS and every aS ∈ AS. Namely, these constraints can be added without
changing the value of the linear program. This implies (by Definition 3.7), that the dual to this
linear program can be written as
Minimize
∑
S⊆[k]
∑
qS∈QS
zS(qS)
Subject to
∑
S⊆[k] yS(q, aS) ≥ V (q, a) ∀q ∈ Q,∀a ∈ A
zS(qS) ≥
∑
q∗∈Q:q∗
S
=qS
π(q∗)yS(q
∗, aS) ∀S ⊆ [k],∀qS ∈ QS ,∀aS ∈ AS
yS(q, aS) ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ [k],∀q ∈ Q,∀aS ∈ AS
(11)
Observe that the constraints in this linear program imply that zS(qS) ≥ 0 for every S ⊆ [k] and
every qS ∈ QS , and thus these constraints can be added without changing the value.
Next, transform this linear program into a linear program with non-negative coefficients. To
do so, observe that the optimal solution to the above linear program satisfies that yS(q, aS) ≤ 1
for every S ⊆ [k], every q ∈ Q and every aS ∈ AS. This follows from the fact that V (a, q) ≤ 1 for
every a ∈ A and every q ∈ Q. Therefore, we can replace yS(q, aS) by yS(q, aS) = 1 − yS(q, aS),
without changing the value of the linear program. This gives us the linear program
Minimize
∑
S⊆[k]
∑
qS∈QS
zS(qS)
Subject to
∑
S⊆[k] yS(q, aS) ≤ 2k − 1− V (q, a) ∀q ∈ Q,∀a ∈ A
zS(qS) +
∑
q∗∈Q:q∗
S
=qS
π(q∗)yS(q
∗, aS) ≥
∑
q∗∈Q:q∗
S
=qS
π(q∗) ∀S ⊆ [k],∀qS ∈ QS ,∀aS ∈ AS
yS(q, aS) ≤ 1 ∀S ⊆ [k],∀q ∈ Q,∀aS ∈ AS
yS(q, aS) ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ [k],∀q ∈ Q,∀aS ∈ AS
zS(qS) ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ [k],∀qS ∈ QS
(12)
Note that all of the coefficients of this linear program are non-negative.
Recall that our goal is to construct a poly(log(|(Q,A)|), 1/ǫ, 2k)-space algorithm for computing v
such that
|v − VsubNS(G)| ≤ ǫ.
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To this end, we add to our linear program a constraint of the form∑
S⊆[k]
∑
qS∈QS
zS(qS) ≤ v′
(for some value v′), and convert this (restricted) linear program into a mixed packing and covering
program, with the guarantee that for δ = (ǫ/2)
2k
, a (1+δ)-approximate solution to the mixed packing
and covering program, implies a solution to the (restricted) linear program, which is ǫ/2-close an
optimal solution. We can then use binary search to find an ǫ-approximation to the original linear
program.
To turn this restricted linear program into a mixed packing and covering problem, we use all of
the constraints above and include the constraint
∑
S⊆[k]
∑
qS∈QS
zS(qS) ≤ v′.
A (1 + δ)-approximate solution to a mixed packing and covering problem is (by definition) a
solution to the problem where all of the inequalities of the form aixi ≤ c are relaxed to aixi ≤
c(1 + δ). In our case, it means that the above ≤ inequalities are replaced with
y¯S(q, aS) ≤ 1 + δ
and ∑
S⊆[k]
yS(q, aS) ≤ (2k − 1− V (q, a))(1 + δ).
We next argue that a (1 + δ)-approximate solution to our mixed packing and covering problem
implies a solution to our (restricted) linear program with value at most v′ + ǫ.
To this end, suppose there these exists such a solution to the mixed packing and covering
problem, and denote it by({yS(q, aS)}S∈[k],q∈Q,aS∈AS , {zS(qS)}S∈[k],qS∈QS) .
Consider the solution ({y′S(q, aS)}S∈[k],q∈Q,aS∈AS , {z′S(qS)}S∈[k],qS∈QS) .
where
y′S(q, aS) =
1
1 + δ
yS(q, aS)
and
z′S(qS) = zS(qS) + δ
∑
q∗∈Q:q∗
S
=qS
π(q∗).
It is easy to see that this solution satisfies the constraints of the (restricted) linear program, and
thus is a solution to the linear program.
The value of this solution is∑
S⊆[k]
∑
qS∈QS
z′S(qS) =
∑
S⊆[k]
∑
qS∈QS

zS(qS) + δ ∑
q∗∈Q∗:q∗
S
=qS
π(q∗)

 =
∑
S⊆[k]
∑
qS∈QS
zS(qS) + δ(2
k − 1) ≤
v′ + 2kδ < v′ + ǫ/2
From Theorem 3.10 we can conclude that approximating the sub-no-signaling value of a game
with a constant number of provers takes space p(log(|(Q,A)|), 1/ǫ, 2k).
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4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1 via Corollary 4.6
In what follows we prove Theorem 4.1. In the proof we rely on Corollary 4.6 which implies that if
L /∈ SPACE(n, 2k) then there is an infinite set N ⊆ N such that for every n ∈ N there is an element
x ∈ {0, 1}n \L such that VsubNS(Gx) ≥ c− 1n . Consider the infinite set N0 ⊆ N such that for every
n ∈ N0 it holds that n ≥ 25k2 . We conclude that for every n ∈ N0 there exists x /∈ {0, 1}n \ L such
that
VsubNS(Gx) ≥ c− 1
n
≥ c− 2−5k2 ≥ 1− 2−5k2 − 2−5k2 ≥ 1− 2−4k2 .
Therefore, to prove Theorem 4.1 it suffices to prove the following theorem.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.2.
We refer the reader to Section 2.3 for a high-level overview of the proof of Theorem 4.2.
5 The Proof of Theorem 4.2
In this section we prove Theorem 4.2, which is our main technical theorem. In the proof, we use
the following theorem from [12].
Theorem 5.1. [12] For every k ∈ N there exists a fixed value αk ≥ 2−O(k2) such that for any
k-player game G, VNS(G) ≥ αk · VhrNS(G).
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let G = (Q,A, V, π) be a k-player game such that VsubNS(G) ≥ 1 − ǫ,
for ǫ = 2−4k
2
. Let {pq}q∈Q be a sub-no-signaling strategy, such that G has sub-no-signaling value
1− ǫ with respect to {pq}q∈Q. Let
GOOD = {q| Pr
a←pq
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 1− 2ǫ]}.
Claim 5.2. Prq←π[q ∈ GOOD] ≥ 1/2.
Proof. We know that
Eq←π[ Pr
a←pq
[V (q, a) = 0]] ≤ ǫ.
By Markov’s inequality this implies that
Pr
q←π
[ Pr
a←pq
[V (q, a) = 0] ≥ 2ǫ] ≤ 1/2
which in turn implies that Prq←π[q ∈ GOOD] ≥ 1/2.
Consider the distribution π∗ = π|(q ∈ GOOD), and let G∗ = (Q,A, V, π∗). Note that G∗ is a
game with sub-no-signaling value at least 1 − 2ǫ, since {pq} is a sub-no-signaling strategy for G∗
that succeeds with probability at least 1− 2ǫ.
We next define a sub-no-signaling strategy {p˜q} for the game G∗, such that for every q ∈ GOOD,
every S ⊆ [k], and every aS ∈ AS , it holds that
Pr[p˜q|S = aS ] ≤ Eq∗←π∗|(q∗
S
=qS)[Pr[pq∗ |S = aS]] (13)
and for every q ∈ GOOD,
Pr
a←p˜q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 1− 2k+2ǫ. (14)
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To this end, we define p˜q in a greedy manner, so that Equation (13) holds, while keeping the
invariant that for every q ∈ GOOD and a ∈ A it holds that p˜q(a) ≤ pq(a). This is done as follows:
Fix any q ∈ GOOD. Start with p˜q = pq. For every S ⊆ [k] and every aS , if
Pr[p˜q|S = aS ] > Eq∗←π∗|(q∗
S
=qS)[Pr[pq∗ |S = aS ]]
then (arbitrarily) reduce p˜q(a
∗) for every a∗ ∈ A such that a∗S = aS so that
Pr[p˜q|S = aS ] = Eq∗←π∗|(q∗
S
=qS)[Pr[pq∗ |S = aS ]],
and in the remaining probability output ⊥. For each S and aS , this step reduces the probability
that V accepts by at most
δS,aS (q) , max{0,Pr[pq|S = aS ]− Eq∗←π∗|(q∗S=qS)[Pr[pq∗ |S = aS ]}.
This follows from the invariant that for every a it holds that p˜q(a) ≤ pq(a). Since we do this for
every S ⊆ [k] and every aS , in total the probability that V accepts is reduced by at most
δ(q) =
∑
S,aS
δS,aS (q).
Note that Equation (13) holds by definition of {p˜q}. To prove Equation (14), it suffices to prove
the following claim.
Claim 5.3. For every q ∈ GOOD, it holds that δ(q) ≤ 2k+1ǫ.
Proof. Since {pq} is a sub-no-signaling strategy, there exists a family of distributions {SimS,qS}
such that for every S ⊆ [k] and every qS ∈ QS and aS ∈ AS,
max
q∗ s.t. q∗
S
=qS
Pr[pq∗ |S = aS ] ≤ Pr[SimS,qS = aS ].
Therefore,
Pr[SimS,qS = aS ] ≥ Eq∗←π∗|(q∗S=qS)[Pr[pq∗ |S = aS ] + δS,aS (q),
which implies that
1 =
∑
aS
Pr[SimS,qS = aS ] ≥
∑
aS
Eq∗←π∗|(q∗
S
=qS)[Pr[pq∗ |S = aS ] +
∑
aS
δS,aS (q) ≥ 1− 2ǫ+
∑
aS
δS,aS (q).
We thus conclude that
∑
aS
δS,aS (q) ≤ 2ǫ, which in turn implies that δ(q) =
∑
S,aS
δS,aS (q) ≤ 2k+1ǫ,
as desired.
Thus, the strategy {p˜q} satisfies Equations (13) and (14).
We next define a family of sub-distributions9 {Sim(1)S,qS}, where Sim
(1)
S,qS
is a sub-distribution over
AS, such that for every S, T ⊆ [k] such that S ⊂ T , and every q ∈ Q and a ∈ A,
Pr[Sim
(1)
T,qT
|S = aS ] ≤ Pr[Sim(1)S,qS = aS ] (15)
9A sub-distribution is a distribution where the total probability can be less than 1, but the probability of each
event must still be non-negative.
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and for every q ∈ GOOD,
Pr
a←Sim
(1)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 1− 23k2ǫ. (16)
We start by defining {Sim′S,qS} by
Pr[Sim′S,qS = aS] , maxq∗∈GOOD|(q∗
S
=qS)
Pr[p˜q∗ |S = aS ].
Note that this is a sub-distribution since by Equation (13),
Pr[Sim′S,qS = aS ] = maxq∗∈GOOD|(q∗
S
=qS)
Pr[p˜q∗ |S = aS ] ≤ Eq∗←π∗|(q∗
S
=qS) Pr[pq∗ |S = aS ],
which together with the linearity of expectation, implies that indeed
∑
aS∈AS
Pr[Sim′S,qS = aS ] ≤
∑
aS∈AS
Eq∗←π∗|(q∗
S
=qS) Pr[pq∗ |S = aS ] = Eq∗←π∗|(q∗S=qS)
∑
aS∈AS
Pr[pq∗ |S = aS ] ≤ 1.
Moreover, Equation (14), together with the definition of {Sim′S,qS}, implies that for every q ∈
GOOD,
Pr
a←Sim′[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 1− 2k+2ǫ. (17)
We next define {Sim(1)S,qS} by modifying {Sim′S,qS} in a greedy manner, to ensure that Equation (15)
is satisfied. This is done by induction starting with sets of size 1. For every set T of size 1, and for
every qT , define
Sim
(1)
T,qT
, Sim′T,qT .
Suppose we defined Sim
(1)
S,qS
for all sets S of size less than i. We next define Sim
(1)
T,qT
for sets T of
size i. To this end, fix any T of size i and fix any qT . Start by setting
Sim
(1)
T,qT
= Sim′T,qT .
For every S ⊂ T and for every aS, if
Pr[Sim
(1)
T,qT
|S = aS] > Pr[Sim(1)S,qS = aS ]
then (arbitrarily) reduce the total probability of Sim
(1)
T,qT
by exactly
ξS,aS(T, qT ) , Pr[Sim
(1)
T,qT
|S = aS ]− Pr[Sim(1)S,qS = aS ],
so that
Pr[Sim
(1)
T,qT
|S = aS] = Pr[Sim(1)S,qS = aS ]
Clearly this ensures that Equation (15) holds. We next argue that despite this reduction in proba-
bility, Equation (16) holds. To this end, note that for every S, T ⊆ [k] such that S ⊂ T , and every
q ∈ Q and a ∈ A,
ξS,aS(T, qT ) ≤ max
{
0,Pr[Sim′T,qT |S = aS ]− Pr[Sim
(1)
S,qS
= aS ]
}
.
Define
ξS(T, qT ) ,
∑
aS
ξS,aS(T, qT ) and ξ(T, qT ) ,
∑
S(T
ξS(T, qT ).
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Claim 5.4. For every T ⊆ [k] and every q ∈ Q
ξ(T, qT ) ≤ 22k2ǫ.
Note that Claim 5.4, together with Equation (17), implies that for every q ∈ GOOD,
Pr
a←Sim
(1)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 1− 2k+2ǫ− 22k2ǫ ≥ 1− 23k2ǫ,
thus establishing Equation (16), as desired.
Proof of Claim 5.4. Fix any T ⊆ [k] and any q ∈ Q. Note that for every S ⊂ T and for every
aS ∈ AS,
Pr[Sim′T,qT |S = aS ]
=
∑
aT :aT |S=aS
Pr[Sim′T,qT = aT ]
=
∑
aT :aT |S=aS
max
q∗∈GOOD|q∗
T
=qT
Pr[p˜q∗ |T = aT ]
≤
∑
aT :aT |S=aS
Eq∗←π∗|q∗|T=qT Pr[pq∗ |T = aT ]
= Eq∗←π∗|q∗
T
=qT Pr[pq∗ |S = aS ]
≤ Pr[SimS,qS = aS ].
By the definition of Sim′S,qS , Sim
(1)
S,qS
, and p˜q, it holds that
Pr[SimS,qS = aS ] ≥ Pr[Sim′S,qS = aS ] ≥ Pr[Sim
(1)
S,qS
= aS ].
Therefore, the equations above imply that
ξS,aS (T, qT ) ≤ Pr[SimS,qS = aS ]− Pr[Sim(1)S,qS = aS ],
which in turn implies that
ξS(T, qT ) =
∑
aS
ξS,aS(T, qT ) = 1−
∑
aS
Pr[Sim
(1)
S,qS
= aS ]. (18)
Note that by definition
∑
aS
Pr[Sim
(1)
S,qS
= aS] =
∑
aS
Pr[Sim′S,qS = aS ]− ξ(S, qS). (19)
Therefore
ξS(T, qT ) ≤ 1−
∑
aS
Pr[Sim′S,qS = aS ] + ξ(S, qS) ≤ 2k+2ǫ+ ξ(S, qS),
where the second inequality follows from Equation (17). This implies that
ξ(T, qT ) ≤ 2|T | · 2k+2ǫ+
∑
S(T
ξ(S, qS). (20)
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We use Equation (20), to prove that for every T ⊆ [k] and for every qT ,
ξ(T, qT ) ≤ 22|T |kǫ. (21)
We prove Equation (21) by induction on the size of T , starting from |T | = 1. For every T of size 1
and for every qT , by definition ξ(T, qT ) = 0.
Suppose Equation (21) holds for every T of size less than i, we prove that it holds for T of size
i as follows:
ξ(T, qT ) ≤ 2|T | · 2k+2ǫ+
∑
S(T
ξ(S, qS)
≤ 2|T | · 2k+2ǫ+ 2|T |22(|T |−1)kǫ
≤ 22k+2ǫ+ 2|T |22|T |k−2kǫ
≤ 22k+2ǫ+ 22|T |k−kǫ ≤ 22|T |kǫ,
as desired, where the first inequality follows from Equation (20), the second inequality follows from
the induction hypothesis, and the other inequalities follow from basic arithmetic.
We next modify Sim
(1)
S,qS
to ensure that its total probability is independent of qS. More specifi-
cally, we define Sim
(2)
S,qS
, which is a modification of Sim
(1)
S,qS
, such that for every ℓ ∈ [k] there exists
αℓ ∈ [0, 1] such that for every S ⊆ [k[ of size ℓ and for every qS ∈ QS , it holds that
∑
aS
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS] = αℓ (22)
In addition, we still ensure that for every S, T ⊆ [k] such that S ⊂ T , and for every q ∈ Q and
a ∈ A,
Pr[Sim
(2)
T,qT
|S = aS ] ≤ Pr[Sim(2)S,qS = aS ] (23)
and for every q ∈ GOOD,
Pr
a←Sim
(2)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ (1− 23k2ǫ)k+1 .10 (24)
To this end, for every S ⊆ [k] and every qS ∈ QS let
βqS =
∑
aS
Pr[Sim
(1)
S,qS
= aS ].
We argue that for every S ⊆ [k],
βqS ≥ 1− 23k
2
ǫ, (25)
10Note that by our assumption that ǫ < 2−4k
2
, Equation (24) implies that for every q ∈ GOOD,
Pr
a←Sim
(2)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ (1− 2−k
2
)k+1.
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as follows: ∑
aS
Pr[Sim
(1)
S,qS
= aS ]
=
∑
aS
max
q∗∈GOOD|(q∗
S
=qS)
Pr[p˜q∗ |S = aS ]− ξ(S, qS)
≥
∑
aS
max
q∗∈GOOD|(q∗
S
=qS)
Pr[p˜q∗ |S = aS ]− 22k2ǫ
≥
∑
aS
Pr[p˜q∗ |S = aS ]− 22k2ǫ
≥ 1− 2k+2ǫ− 22k2ǫ
≥ 1− 23k2ǫ,
where the first equation follows from Equation (19) together with the definition of Sim′S,qS , the
second equation follows from Claim 5.4, the third equation holds for every q∗ such that q∗S = qS ,
the forth equation follows from Equation (14), and the last equation follows from basic arithmetic.
For every ℓ ∈ [k], let
αℓ = (1− 2−3k2ǫ)ℓ.
For every S ⊆ [k] of size ℓ, and for every qS ∈ QS and aS ∈ AS , define
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS ] , Pr[Sim
(1)
S,qS
= aS ] · αℓ
βqS
.
Note that by definition ∑
aS
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS ] = αℓ,
as desired. Moreover, Sim
(2)
S,qS
is a sub-distribution, since
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS] = Pr[Sim
(1)
S,qS
= aS ] · αℓ
βqS
≤ Pr[Sim(1)S,qS = aS ],
where the first equality follows from the definition of Sim
(2)
S,qS
and the last inequality follows from
Equation (25) together with the the definition of αℓ.
We next argue that Sim
(2)
S,qS
satisfies Equation (23). To this end, fix any S ⊂ T ⊆ [k] and fix
any q ∈ Q and a ∈ A. Note that
Pr[Sim
(2)
T,qT
|S = aS ] =
Pr[Sim
(1)
T,qT
|S = aS ] ·
α|T |
βqT
≤
Pr[Sim
(1)
S,qS
= aS ] ·
α|T |
βqT
≤
Pr[Sim
(1)
S,qS
= aS ] ·
α|S|
βqS
=
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS ],
as desired, where the first equation follows from the definition of Sim
(2)
T,qT
, the second equation
follows from Equation (15), the third equation follows from the definition of αℓ together with
Equation (25), and the last equation follows again from the definition of Sim
(2)
S,qS
.
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Finally, note that for every q ∈ GOOD,
Pr
a←Sim
(2)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] = Pr
a←Sim
(1)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] · αk
βq
≥ Pr
a←Sim
(1)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] · αk ≥ (1− 23k2ǫ)k+1,
as desired, where the first equation follows from the definition of Sim
(2)
[k],q, the second equation fol-
lows from the fact that βq ≤ 1, and the last inequality follows from Equation (16) and from the
definition of αk.
We next modify {Sim(2)S,qS} to a new family of sub-distributions {Sim
(3)
S,qS
} that satisfies that for
every q ∈ Q and every S ⊆ [k],
Pr[Sim
(3)
S,qS
= aS ] ≥
k−|S|∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
∑
T)S,|T |=|S|+i
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S = aS ]. (26)
To this end, we define
Pr[Sim
(3)
S,qS
= aS ] ,
1
k2|S|
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS ]
Claim 5.5. {Sim(3)S,qS} satisfies Equation (26).
Proof. Fix any q ∈ Q and any subset S ⊆ [k]. Note that
k−|S|∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
∑
T)S,|T |=|S|+i
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S = aS ]
≤
k−|S|∑
i=1
∑
T)S,|T |=|S|+i
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S = aS]
=
k−|S|∑
i=1
∑
T)S,|T |=|S|+i
1
k2(|S|+i)
Pr[Sim
(2)
T,qT
|S = aS ]
≤
k−|S|∑
i=1
∑
T)S,|T |=|S|+i
1
k2(|S|+i)
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS]
≤
k−|S|∑
i=1
(
k − |S|
i
)
1
k2(|S|+i)
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS ]
≤ 1
k2|S|
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS] ·
k−|S|∑
i=1
(
k − |S|
i
)
1
k2i
≤ Pr[Sim(3)S,qS = aS ] ·
k−|S|∑
i=1
(
k − |S|
i
)
1
k2i
≤ Pr[Sim(3)S,qS = aS ]
as desired, where the first equation follows from basic arithmetic, the second equation follows
from the definition of Sim
(3)
T,qT
, the third equation follows from Equation (23), the forth and fifth
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equations follow from basic arithmetic, the six follows from the definition of Sim
(3)
T,qT
, and the last
equation follows from the fact that
k−|S|∑
i=1
(
k − |S|
i
)
1
k2i
≤
k−|S|∑
i=1
ki · 1
k2i
=
k−|S|∑
i=1
1
ki
≤
k−|S|∑
i=1
2−i ≤
∞∑
i=1
2−i = 1.
Equation (24), together with the definition of {Sim(3)S,qS} and the assumption that ǫ ≤ 2−4k
2
,
implies that for every q ∈ GOOD,
Pr
a←Sim
(3)
[k],q
[V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 2−3k log k. (27)
Equation (23), together with the definition of {Sim(3)S,qS}, implies that for every S, T ⊆ [k] such that
S ( T , and every q ∈ Q and a ∈ A,
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S = aS ] ≤ Sim(3)S,qT |S = aS ] (28)
since
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S = aS ] = 1
k2|T |
Pr[Sim
(2)
T,qT
|S = aS ]
≤ 1
k2|T |
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS ]
≤ 1
k2|S|
Pr[Sim
(2)
S,qS
= aS]
= Pr[Sim
(3)
S,qS
= aS ].
In what follows, we define an honest-referee no-signaling strategy for the game G∗ that convinces
V to accept with probability at least 2−3k log k. By Theorem 5.1 this implies that
VNS(G∗) ≥ 2−O(k2) · 2−3k log k = 2−O(k2).
By the definition of G∗ (and by Claim 5.2), this implies that
VNS(G) ≥ 1
2
· 2−O(k2) ≥ 2−O(k2),
as desired.
Therefore, it suffices to define an honest-referee no-signaling strategy for the game G∗ that
convinces V to accept with probability at least 2−3k log k. We do this in stages.
First, we define a strategy {p(1)q }. This strategy is not defined over A but over A∗ = A∗1×. . .×A∗k,
where for each i ∈ [k], A∗i , Ai ∪ {∗}. Fix any q ∈ Q.
For any non-empty subset S ⊆ [k] and every aS ∈ AS , we define
Pr[p(1)q = (aS , (∗)k−|S|)] ,
k−|S|∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
T⊇S,|T |=|S|+i
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S = aS ].
Equation (26) implies that this value is non-negative. Moreover, note that for every a ∈ A,
Pr[p(1)q = a] = Pr[Sim
(3)
[k],q = a].
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We next ensure that p
(1)
q is a distribution. To this end, note that
∑
a∈A∗
Pr[p(1)q = a] =
∑
S⊆[k]:|S|≥1
∑
aS∈AS
Pr[p(1)q = (aS , (∗)k−|S|)] =
∑
S⊆[k]:|S|≥1
∑
aS∈AS
k−|S|∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
T⊇S,|T |=|S|+i
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S = aS ] ≤
∑
S⊆[k]:|S|≥1
k−|S|∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
T⊇S,|T |=|S|+i
∑
aS∈AS
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S = aS ]
Note that
∑
aS∈AS
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S = aS] =
∑
aT∈AT
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
= aT ] depends only on T , and is
otherwise independent of qT . This follows from Equation (22) and from the definition of Sim
(3)
T,qT
.
Therefore,
∑
a∈A∗ Pr[p
(1)
q = a] is independent of q. We denote by
α ,
∑
a∈A∗
Pr[p(1)q = a].
If α > 1 then we convert p
(1)
q to a distribution p
(2)
q defined as follows: For every a ∈ A∗,
Pr[p(2)q = a] ,
1
α
Pr[p(1)q = a].
If α < 1 then we convert p
(1)
q to a distribution p
(2)
q defined as follows: Let
Pr[p(2)q = (∗)k] , 1− α,
and for every a ∈ A∗ \ {(∗)k} let
Pr[p(2)q = a] , Pr[p
(1)
q = a]
It is easy to see that in either case, p
(2)
q is a distribution.
Claim 5.6. {p(2)q } satisfies the honest referee no-signaling condition.
Proof. In what follows, we use the following notation: If p
(1)
q satisfies α =
∑
a∗∈A∗ Pr[p
(1)
q = a] > 1
then let γ = 1α , and otherwise let γ = 1.
Fix any subset S ⊆ [k]. We argue that for every q, q∗ ∈ GOOD such that qS = q∗S, and for every
aS ∈ A∗S,
Pr[p(2)q |S = aS ] = Pr[p(2)q∗ |S = aS ].
Define S′ ⊆ S to be the subset for which for every i ∈ S′ it holds that ai ∈ A, and for every
i ∈ S \ S′ it holds that ai = ∗.
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Pr[p(2)q |S = aS ] =∑
V⊆[k]\S
∑
av∈AV
Pr[p(2)q = (aS′ , aV , (∗)k−|S
′∪V |) =
∑
V⊆[k]\S
∑
av∈AV
k−|S′∪V |∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
T⊇S′∪V,|T |=|S′∪V |+i
γ · Pr[Sim(3)T,qT |S′∪V = aS′∪V ] =
∑
V⊆[k]\S
k−|S′∪V |∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
T⊇S′∪V,|T |=|S′∪V |+i
γ ·
∑
av∈AV
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S′∪V = aS′∪V ] =
∑
V⊆[k]\S
k−|S′∪V |∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
T⊇S′∪V,|T |=|S′∪V |+i
γ · Pr[Sim(3)T,qT |S′ = aS′ ] =
γ ·
∑
T⊇S′
Pr[Sim
(3)
T,qT
|S′ = aS′ ] ·

 ∑
V⊆T\S
(−1)|T |−|S′∪V |


Therefore, to argue that indeed
Pr[p(2)q |S = aS ] = Pr[p(2)q∗ |S = aS]
it suffices to prove that for every T ⊇ S′ such that ℓ , |T \ S| ≥ 1, it holds that
∑
V⊆T\S
(−1)|T |−|S′∪V | = 0,
or equivalently that for every such T ,
∑
V⊆T\S
(−1)|S′∪V | = 0.
This follows from the following calculation:
∑
V⊆T\S
(−1)|S′∪V | = (−1)|S′| ·
∑
V⊆T\S
(−1)|V | =
ℓ∑
j=0
(
ℓ
j
)
(−1)j = (1− 1)ℓ = 0,
as desired.
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